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1957] TESTIMONY OF POLITICAL DEVIANTS 
COMPELLING THE TESTIMONY OF 
POLITICAL DEVIANTS* 
0. John Rogget 
History of Immunity Acts 
375 
BESIDES the two specific problems which the new federal act presents, namely, whether it imposes nonjudicial functions 
on federal courts, and whether it should, does and can protect 
against the substantial danger of state prosecution, there is a gen-
eral objection that one can raise against it, and to other acts of the 
same type: they relate to the area of belief and opinion, the very 
area which was involved when the English people, spearheaded by 
the Puritans, engaged in the struggle with the Crown that finally 
resulted in the establishment of a right of silence. At least if we 
are to have immunity acts, let us confine them to the area in which 
most of them have operated in the past, the area of economic reg-
ulation. 
Immunity acts have a long history. They go back almost to the 
time of the establishment of the privilege. However, they have 
rarely been applied to the field of dogma. 
Perhaps the earliest such act dates from 1697 in the colony of 
Connecticut. This act related to witnesses: they were called upon 
to give testimony under oath "alwayes provided that no person re-
quired to give testimonie as aforesaid shall be punished for what 
he doth confesse against himselfe when under oath. "1 Gs This was 
but a short time after the right to remain silent had been extended 
to witnesses as distinguished from defendants.1 Go 
• The first instalment .of this article was published in the December 1956 issue [55 
MICH. L. REv. 163].-Ed. 
t Member, New York Bar; A.B. 1922, University of Illinois, LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. 1931, 
Harvard Law School; formerly (1939-40) United States Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; author, Our Vanishing 
Civil Liberties (1949).-Ed. 
108 3 COLONIAL RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT ·296 (1689-1706). See also an act of 1703, 
id. at •409-410, and one of 1711, 4 id. at •154. 
160 For instances as to witnesses see Rex v. Reading, 7 How. St. Tr. 259 at 296 (1679); 
Rex v. Whitebread, 7 How. St. Tr. 3ll at 361 (1679); Rex v. Langhorn, 7 How. St. Tr. 
417 at 435 (1679); Rex v. Castlemaine, 7 How. St. Tr. 1067 at 1096 (1680); Rex v. Stafford, 
7 How. St. Tr. 1293 at 1314 (1680); Rex v. Plunket, 8 How. St. Tr. 447 at 480-481 (1681); 
Rex v. Rosewell, IO How. St. Tr. 147 at 169 (1684); Rex v. Oates, 10 How St. Tr. 1079 at 
1098-1100, 1123 (1685). 
In England the practice of granting a pardon in order to obtain testimony probably 
originated even a little earlier than the Connecticut act. See Rex v. Reading, 7 How. St. 
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The first provision for immunity that attained any general 
vogue was in an act against gaming. The initial act was passed in 
England in 1710, the same year that marked the death of Lord 
Holt, the last English judge to persist in the practice of questioning 
a defendant. According to this act the loser could sue the winner 
to recover his losses, and the winner had to answer under oath, but 
when he had answered and returned what he had won he was to 
"be acquitted, indemnified, and discharged from any further or 
other punishment, forfeiture, or penalty."170 Similar statutes were 
enacted in various of the colonies,171 and even without such en-
actment the act of 9 Anne, c. 14 was declared to be in force in this 
country.172 
Thereafter from time to time the people would become con-
cerned about certain conduct, pass an act regulating it, and often 
put in an immunity provision. In addition to further acts against 
gaming,173 there were acts against lotteries,174 usury,175 bribery of 
Tr. 259 at 296 (1679); Rex v. Earl of Shaftesbury, 8 How. St. Tr. 759 at 817 (1681). In 
the next century Lord Chief Justice Camden commented in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. 
St. Tr. 1030 at 1074 (1765): "Nay, if the vengeance of the government requires a produc-
tion of the author, it is hardly possible for him to escape the impeachment of the printer, 
who is sure to seal his own pardon by his discovery." In Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 
121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861), the Queen's Bench held that a pardon took away the right of 
silence, and this in spite of the fact that under the Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Wm. 
3, c. 2, §3, the pardon was not pleadable to an impeachment by the House of Commons. 
170 9 Anne, c. 14, §4 (1710). 
17118 COLONIAL RECORDS OF GEORGIA 608, 613 (Candler, 1911) (an act of 1764, §4); 
2 Acrs AND REsOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 836, 837 (Boston, 1874) 
(an act of 1736-1737, §4); 3 id. at 45, 47 (Boston, 1878) (an act of 1742-1743, §4); 5 
COLONIAL LAws OF NEW YORK 621, 623 (an act of 1774); 6 LAws OF VIRGINIA 76, 78 
(Hening, 1819) (an act of 1748, §4). South Carolina in 1712 by legislative enactment 
provided that statutes made in England since the eighth year of Queen Anne were to 
be in force there. The PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 100, appx. 20-21 (Grimke, 1790). 
The Georgia statute was held to be constitutional in Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 225 (1853). 
The colony of New York also had an immunity provision in an act against private 
lotteries. 5 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 639, 642 (an act of 1774). 
172 United States v. Dixon, (C.C. D.C. 1830) 25 Fed. Cas. 872 at 873, No. 14,970; 
Kn.TY, A REPORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES 268 (1811) (Maryland). 
173 See, e.g., 2 Cal. Codes and Stat. (1876) 1]13,334; Conn. State Stat. (1854) c. 22, §2 
(answers not admissible in evidence against one); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1845) c. 46, §5; 2 Ind. 
Rev. Stat. (1852) 372, §89; Md. Code (1860) art. 30, §65; 1 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1889) §3819 
(testimony may not be used against one); 1 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (2d ed. 1836) 668 (answers 
not admissible in subsequent proceedings); 2 N.C. Code (1883) §2843 (answers not ad-
missible in any criminal prosecution); Va. Code (3d ed. 1873) c. 195, §20 (immunity 
provision for witnesses). The Missouri provision was held valid in Ex parte Buskelt, 106 
Mo. 602, 17 S.W. 753 (1891). The Virginia provision was held not applicable to a lottery 
prosecution in Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892 (1881). 
174 See,. e.g., I Ind. Rev. Stat. (1888) §1799; 4 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1942) §9-1604; 
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §436.510 (3) (testimony not to be used in any prosecution). 
175 See, e.g., I Ind. Rev. Stat. (1852) c. 57, §8 (answers not to be used in any criminal 
proceeding); I N.Y. Rev. Stat. (2d ed. 1836) 761; N.Y. Laws (1837) c. 430, §8, pp. 487-488 
(answers not to be used before any grand jury or on the trial of any indictment). These 
provisions were held constitutional. Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153 (1860); Henry v. Bank 
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public officials,176 duelling,177 frauds on creditors,178 and for the 
regulation of the sale of spirituous liquors179 which included im- · 
munity provisions. 
Judge Grosscup had the feel of most of these statutes when he 
wrote concerning the decisions sustaining their validity: " ... It is 
interesting to note, however, that all of these cases related to 
offenses, the wisdom of which were then somewhat debated ques-
tions, and the prosecution of which was, to some extent, the 
triumph or defeat of the prevailing popular opinion .... Some of 
these cases naturally aroused the indignation of the community in 
which the court sat. All of them were cases, doubtless, where the 
immunity claimed by the witness aroused no just sympathy. They 
each presented a situation where the fifth amendment, if construed 
broadly, seemed to offer an obstacle to a just administration of the 
criminal law .... "180 
of Salina, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 523 (1843), affirming 1 Hill (N.Y.) 555 (1841); Stevens v. White, 
5 Hill (N.Y.) 548 (1843); Perrine &: Pixley v. Striker, 7 Paige (N.Y.) 598 (1839). In 
Henry v. Bank of Salina, supra, the court also held that the word plaintiff in the New 
York act of 1837 extended to the plaintiff in interest as well as the plaintiff of record, 
but in Kempshall v. Burns, 4 Hill (N.Y.) 468 (1842), affirming 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 360 (1840), 
held, and in Cloyes v. Thayer, 3 Hill (N.Y.) 564, 566 (1842), stated that a person called 
as a witness who was neither, could still claim his privilege. In Henry v. Salina Bank, 1 
N.Y. 83 (1847), affirming 2 Denio (N.Y.) 155 (1846), the court reached the same result 
on the additional ground that despite the provision in the act of 1837 the witness might 
still be subjected to a forfeiture. 
176 N.Y. Laws (1853) c. 539, §14, pp. 1012-1013 (testimony not to be used in any 
subsequent proceeding); N.Y. Penal Code (Donnan, 5th ed., 1886) §79; Mass. Acts and 
Resolves (1871) c. 91, §1, p. 490. Both New York acts were sustained. People v. Kelly, 24 
N.Y. 74 (1861); People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319 (1887). The Massachusetts act 
was declared unconstitutional. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871). 
177 Ark. Stat. (1884) §1792 (testimony not admissible in any subsequent proceeding); 
2 Cal. Codes and Stat. (1876) 1]13.232 (testimony not admissible in any subsequent pro-
ceeding); 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (2d ed. 1836) 572 (testimony not admissible in any ~ubsequent 
proceeding); Va. Laws (1869-1870) c. 355, §1 (testimony not admissible in any subsequent 
proceeding). In Cullen v. Commonwealth, 24 Gratt. (Va.) 624 (1873), the court held that 
the Virginia statute was not broad enough to take away the right of silence. 
178 N.Y. Code of Civil Procedure §292 (5) (Townshend, 10th ed., 1870) (answers not 
to be used in any criminal proceeding); 1 N.C. Code (1883) §488 (5) (answers not to be 
used in any criminal proceeding). The New York provision was assumed to be constitu-
tional in Lathrop v. Clapp, 40 N.Y. 328 (1869), and the North Carolina provision was 
held constitutional in LaFontaine v. Southern Undenvriters Assn., 83 N.C. 132 (1880). 
170 N.H. Gen. Stat. (1867) c. 99, §20 (limited immunity provision for employee). This 
section was held constitutional in State v. Nowell, 58 N.H. 314 (1878). 
In addition there were a few miscellaneous immunity provisions. Both Arkansas and 
California gave a limited grant of immunity to one of two or more conspirators. A DI-
GEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, c. 52, §72 (English, 1848); Cal. Laws (1855) c. 82, §5, 
p. 106. Indiana provided a limited immunity to a witness whose answer showed the 
commission of a misdemeanor. Ind. Rev. Stat. (1881) §1800. All these provisions were 
held constitutional. State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853); Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal, 184 
(1857); Bedgood v. State, 115 Ind. 275, 17 N.E. 621 (1888). In State v. Quarles, supra, 
the indictment was for gaming at poker. 
180 United States v. James, (N.D. Ill. 1894) 60 F. 257 at 261. 
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In comparing our accusatorial with the inquisitional system he 
commented: "In the one, grew up a criminal procedure that was 
almost purely inquisitorial, and whose history now appalls the en-
lightened conscience; in the other, grew up a system purely accusa-
tory, where the offending individual could lawfully stand in silence, 
and demand proof from sources other than himself. In the one, the 
power of the sovereign pervaded every nook and corner of the in-
dividual; in the other, the power of the sovereign came only to the 
outward person of the subject, and there stopped. This jealousy 
against any touch, until the right of individual liberty was shown 
forfeited, proved the corner stone of popular liberty." In the next 
paragraph Judge Grosscup called the privilege the "right of 
silence."181 The dissent in the Ullmann case relied heavily on 
Judge Grosscup's opinion and referred to the privilege variously 
as the "privilege of silence," "federally protected right of silence," 
"this right of silence" and simply "right of silence."182 
The first federal act was in 1857. The circumstance which led 
to its enactment was the refusal of a correspondent of The New 
York Times, James W. Simonton, to disclose to a select committee 
of the House of Representatives the names of the members of the 
House who had indicated to him that their votes were for sale with 
reference to certain measures then pending before Congress. 
Simonton had written a letter to the Times on the subject of con-
gressional corruption, which the Times had published over his 
initials. The Times had also commented on the subject editori-
ally. These items had led to the appointment of the special com-
mittee which had sought Simonton's testimony.183 The result of 
his refusal to divulge names was the act of 1857. It provided, 
among other things, that a person had to testify, but he was not to 
"be held to answer criminally in any court of justice, or subject to 
any penalty or forfeiture for any fact or act touching which he shall 
be required to testify," and his statements were not to "be com-
petent testimony in any criminal proceeding against such witness 
in any court of justice."184 
This act was soon abused. Deviants, including at least two who 
had already been indicted, arranged to give testimony before a 
181 Id. at 263. 
182 350 U.S. 422 at 440, 445, 446, 450 (1956). 
183 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d scss., 403-411, 435-444 (1857). 
184 11 Stat. 155 at 156 (1857). In the same year California adopted a similar statute. 
Cal. Laws (1857) c. 95, p. 97. 
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congressional investigating committee, and in this way obtained 
immunity.185 The two who were indicted had the indictment 
against them dismissed. The indictment was for the embezzlement 
of some $2,000,000 of Indian trust bonds from the Interior De-
partment. 
Congress accordingly amended the act of 1857 in 1862 by 
eliminating the prohibition against prosecution but leaving that 
against the subsequent use of testimony given.186 As amended, the 
immunity provision of the act of 1857 became in turn Rev. Stat. 
§859 (1875), 28 U.S.C. (1940) §634, and 18 U.S.C. (1952) §3486. 
It was this immunity provision which was again amended in Au-
gust 1954 to become the new federal immunity act, and is now 
embarked upon what will probably be a larger history than ever 
before. 
In 1868 Congress adopted companion legislation to the act of 
1857 as amended. The occasion this time was the decision by 
Vice Chancellor Sir William Page Wood in United States v. 
McRae,181 affirmed on this point on appeal in an opinion by Lord 
Chancellor Chelmsford,188 that the United States in a suit in equity 
in England against a Confederate agent could not compel him to 
make discovery because this might expose him to a forfeiture in 
this country.180 It was this case which the government did not cite 
and everyone else overlooked in United States v. Murdock.100 The 
decision on appeal in the McRae case was in December 1867. The 
next month a bill was introduced in Congress,101 and passed in 
February, which provided that "no discovery, or evidence obtained 
by means of any judicial proceeding from any party or witness in 
this or any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any 
manner used against such party a witness .... "102 This provision 
became Rev. Stat. §860. 
At first there was no activity under Rev. Stat. §859, and very 
little under Rev. Stat. §860. Several federal courts of first instance 
185 CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st sess., 449 (1861); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 
56, 228, 364 (1861-1862). 
186 12 Stat. 333 (1862). 
187 L.R. 4 Eq. 327 (1867). 
188 L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (1867). 
189 CoNc:. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d sess., 1334 (1868). In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 at 632 (1886), Justice Bradley stated that the act of 1868 was passed to alleviate the 
search and seizure provisions in the revenue acts of 1863 and 1867, but he in no way 
documented his statement. 
100 284 U.S. 141 (1931). 
191 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d sess., 845 (1868). 
102 15 Stat. 37 (1868). 
380 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
held that the latter sectiqn took away one's right of silence,193 but 
the question did not reach the Supreme Court until the case of 
Counselman v. Hitchcock,194 decided almost a quarter of a century 
after the passage of the act of 1868. In the meantime there had 
occurred the expansion of the railroads, their unfair and discrimi-
natory rates and practices, and the passage by Congress, in 1887, of 
the Interstate Commerce Act.195 This act contained two limited 
immunity provisions,196 but the Counselman case did not arise 
under these immunity provisions; it arose under Rev. Stat. §860. 
A grand jury in Illinois was inquiring whether certain shipments 
of grain had been carried for less than the published and legal 
tariff rate. The defendant claimed his right of silence, and the 
Supreme Court sustained him on the ground that the immunity 
provided by Rev. Stat. §860 was not broad enough: it did not in-
clude immunity from prosecution. The next year Congress 
amended the Interstate Commerce Act by providing that a person 
subpoenaed under the provisions of that act had to testify but was 
not to "be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for 
or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which 
he may testify .... "197 Three years later the Supreme Court sus-
tained the constitutionality of this act in Brown v. W alker.198 
This act became known as the Compulsory Testimony Act of 
1893,100 and was sometimes specifically referred to in future im-
munity provisions.200 The case of Brown v. Walker, with some 
exceptions, became the basis for such provisions. The exceptions 
included the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, an act of 1917 prohibiting 
the manufacture or sale of liquor in Alaska, the Federal Food, 
193 United States v. McCarthy, (S.D. N.Y. 1883) 18 F. 87; United States v. Williams, 
(S.D. Ohio 1872) 28 Fed. Cas. 670, No. 16,717; United States v. Brown, (D.C. Ore. 1871) 
24 Fed. Cas. 1273, No. 14,671; In re Strouse, (D.C. Nev. 1871) 23 Fed. Cas. 261, No. 13,548; 
In re Phillips, (D.C. Va. 1869) 19 Fed. Cas. 506, No. 11,097. 
194142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
10:; 24 Stat. 379. 
196 Section 9 [24 Stat. 382 (1887), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §9], and section 12 [24 Stat. 383, 
as amended, 26 Stat. 743 at 744 (1891)] (" ••• but such evidence or testimony shall not 
be used against such person on the trial of any criminal proceeding"). 
197 27 Stat. 444 (1893), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §46. 
198 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
199 See, e.g., 56 Stat. 23 at 30, §202 (g} (1942) (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); 
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 at 3, n.2, 4 (1948). 
200 See, e.g., 32 Stat. 828 (1903); 42 Stat. 1002 (1922), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §1'5 (Grain 
Futures Act); 56 Stat. 30 (1942) (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); 56 Stat. 297 
(1942), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §1017 (a) (Freight Forwarders Act); 60 Stat. 770, 771, 42 U.S.C. 
(1952) §1812 (a) (3) (Atomic Energy Act of 1946); 63 Stat. 8, 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) 
§2026 (b) (Export Control Act -of 1949); 63 Stat. 27, 28-29, 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) 
§1896 (f) (6) (Housing and Rent Act of 1949); 68 Stat. 948, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) 
§2201 (c) (Atomic Energy Act of 1954). 
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act, and the Internal Security Act of 1950.201 These 
acts for some reason used the old form of immunity provision, and 
forbade only the subsequent use of the testimony or statement ob-
tained. The provision in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 came before 
the Supreme Court and was of course held not to take away an 
individual's right of silence.202 Nevertheless, the provision was 
not only retained but even further restricted, in 1938, to "except 
such testimony as may be given" by the bank'.rupt "in the hearing 
upon objections to his discharge."203 
In February 1903, as part of a legislative program for the cor-
rection of corporate abuses, Congress put immunity provisions in 
three different statutes: the act establishing the Department of 
Commerce and Labor, which conferred upon a commissioner of 
corporations investigatory powers similar to those possessed by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission;204 the Elkins Amendment205 to 
the Interstate Commerce Act; and an act making large appropria-
tions for the enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act, the 
Sherman Law and other enactments.206 Three years later District 
Judge Humphrey, in a case involving an indictment in Illinois 
against the members of the "beef trust" for alleged violations of 
the Sherman Act, sustained pleas in bar of the individual de-
fendants, although not of the corporate defendants, on the ground 
that the individual defendants had obtained immunity by making 
available to the federal commissioner of corporations at his de-
mand, certain books and records.207 However, these defendants 
had not been subpoenaed and they had not been put under oath. 
There was sharp criticism of this decision. President Theodore 
Roosevelt declared that it came "measurably near to making the 
law a farce," and asked Congress to "pass a declaratory act stating 
its real intention."208 Congress thereupon enacted that the im-
munity granted by the act of 1893 and the three acts of February 
1903 was to "extend only to a natural person who, in obedience to 
20130 Stat. 544 at 548 (1898); 39 Stat. 903 at 906 (1917); 52 Stat. 1040 at 1057 (1938), 
21 U.S.C. (1952) §373; 61 Stat. 163 at 168 (1947), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §135 (c); 64 Stat. 987 at 
991-992 (1950), 50 u.s.c. (1$52) §783 (f). 
202 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1923); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355 
(1923); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920). 
203 52 Stat. 840 at 847, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §25 (a)(lO). 
204 32 Stat. 825 at 828 (1903). 
205 32 Stat. 847 at 848-849 (1903), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §43. 
206 32 Stat. 854 at 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §32, 49 U.S.C. (1952) §47. 
207 United States v. Armour&: Co., (N.D. Ill. 1906) 142 F. 808. 
208 H.R. Doc. No. 706, 59th Cong., 1st sess., 3 (1906)., 
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a subpoena, gives testimony under oath or produces evidence,. 
documentary or otherwise, under oath."200 
During all this period both Rev. Stat. §§859 and 860 continued 
on the books. In 1910 Congress repealed section 860210 on the 
ground that after the Counselman211 decision it had "become a 
shield to the criminal and an obstruction to justice."212 But for 
some reason Congress overlooked section 859; it remained in force 
to become, as we have seen, the new federal immunity act. 
Later in 1910 Congress passed the Mann Act and in 1914 the 
first Federal Trade Commission Act, and included in both a broad 
immunity provision.213 The one in the latter act was similar to the 
one in the act of 1893 as amended in 1906. Between this time and 
the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 Congress passed seven 
more acts which contained similar immunity provisions: the Ship-
ping Act of 1916;214 an act creating a tariff commission;215 the Na-
tional Prohibition Act of 1919;216 the Packers and Stockyards 
Act;2 n the Grain Futures Act;218 the Perishable Agricultural Com-
modities Act, 1930;210 and the Tariff Act of 1930.220 
With the Securities Act of 1933 came a new refinement. The 
careful drafters of that act provided that in order to get immunity 
a person first had to claim his privilege.221 Since then Congress 
has enacted thirty regulatory measures which contained immunity 
provisions. Twenty-four of these measures contained the refined 
form of immunity provision in the Securities Act of 1933.222 0£ 
the remainder, three used the older style of the 1893 act as amended 
§49. 
200 34 Stat. 798 (1906), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §33, 49 U.S.C. (1952) §48. 
210 36 Stat. 352. 
211 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
212 H.R. Rep. 266, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 2 (1910). 
213 36 Stat. 826 at 827, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §2424 (b); 38 Stat. 717 at 723, 15 U.S.C. (1952) 
214 39 Stat. 728 at 737, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §827. 
2m 39 Stat. 795 at 797 (1916). 
216 41 Stat. 305 at 317. 
217 42 Stat. 159 at 168 (1921), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §222. 
218 42 Stat. 998 at 1002 (1922), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §15. 
210 46 Stat. 531 at 536-537, 7 U.S.C. (1952) §499m (f). 
220 46 Stat. 700 (1930), 19 U.S.C. (1952) §1333 (c). 
22148 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §77v (c). 
222 48 Stat. 881 at 900, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78u (d) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 48 
Stat. 1064 at 1097, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §409 (1) (Communications Act of 1934); 48 Stat. 1113 
at 1114 (1934) (an act to amend the Air Commerce Act of 1926); 49 Stat. 449 at 456 
(1935), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §161 (3) (National Labor Relations Act); 49 Stat. 803 at 832, 15 
U.S.C. (1952) §79r(e) (Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); 49 Stat. 838 at 858 
(1935), 16 U.S.C. (1952) §825f (g) (Federal Power Act); 49 Stat. 1985 at 1991 (1936), 46 
U.S.C. (1952) §1124 (c) (Merchant Marine Act); 50 Stat. 72 at 87 (Bituminous Coal Act 
of 1937); 52 Stat. 821 at 828-829 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §717m (h); 52 Stat. 973 at 1022-
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in 1906;223 and three simply forbade the subsequent use of any 
evidence or ·statement obtained.224 The drafters of the Securities 
Act of 1933 proved to be foresighted on behalf of the government, 
for in United States v. Monia225 the Supreme Court held that un-
der the older form, in that case one of the acts of February 1903 as 
amended in 1906, a witness got immunity even though he had not 
made any claim, to his right of silence. 
A history of immunity acts thus shows three things. Such acts 
began almost as soon as the right of silence established itself. How-
ever, they were almost never of general application but always 
limited to a particular area. For instance, although Congress has 
passed at least fifty acts containing immunity provisions, all but 
two, Rev. Stat. §§859 and 860, have been restricted to specific types 
of violations. Most important of all, immunity acts generally have 
not applied to deviations from prevalent beliefs, thoughts, opin-
ions, associations, and utterances-the fields also protected by the 
guarantees of the First Amendment. On the contrary, nearly all 
1023, 49 U.S.C. (1952) §644 (i) (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938); 52 Stat. 1094 at 1107 
(1938), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §362 (c) (Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act); 53 Stat. 1360 
at 1370, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §405 (f) (Social Securily Act Amendments of 1939); 54 Stat. 847 
at 853-854, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §80b-9 (d) (Investment Company Act of 1940); 56 Stat. 23 at 
30 (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); 56 Stat. 284 at 297 (1942), 49 U.S.C. (1952) 
§1017 (a) (Freight Fonvarders Act); 56 Stat. 176 at 179 (1942), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §1152 (a) (4) 
(Second War Powers Act); 60 Stat. 755 at 770-771, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1812 (a) (3) (Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946); 61 Stat. 136 at 150-151 (Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947); 
62 Stat. 101 at 106-107 (1948), 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) §1931 (b); 63 Stat. 7 at 8, 50 U.S.C. 
Appx. (1952) §2026 (b) (Export Control Act of 1949); 63 Stat. 18 at 27, 28-29, 50 U.S.C. 
Appx. (1952) §1896 (f) (6) (Housing and Rent Act of 1949); 64 Stat. 798 at 816-817, 50 
U.S.C. Appx. (1952) §2155 (b) (Defense Production Act of 1950); 64 Stat. 873 at 882-883 
(1950), 12 U.S.C. (1952) §1820 (d) (Federal Deposit Insurance Act); 68 Stat. 919 at 948, 
42 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) §2201 (c) (Atomic Energy Act of 1954). 
223 49 Stat. 543 at 550 (Motor Carrier Act of 1935); 49 Stat. 872 at 875 (1935), 53 
Stat. 363 (1939), 26 U.S.C. (1952) §3119 (Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act); 52 
Stat. 1060 at 1065, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §209 (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938). 
224 See note 201 supra. 
22r, 317 U.S. 424 (1943). The history of federal immunity provisions has been a topic 
of discussion on several occasions in Supreme Court opinions. There are such discussions 
in the Monia case in the majorily opinion of Justice Roberts, at 427-430, as well as the 
minority one of Justice Frankfurter, at 432-438. For further such discussions see Smith v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 137 at 146-148 (1949); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 at 327, 
335-340 (1950). See also Dixon, "The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes,'' 
22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447 at 450-467 (1954). 
A partial catalog of federal immunity provisions may be found in Shapiro v. United 
States, 335 U.S. I at 6, 7, n.4 (1948). That case held that a claim of privilege as to certain 
records did not give immunity under an applicable immunity provision, for the reason 
that the records in question, a!Lhough only the customary records of the defendant, were 
required to be kept under regulations of the Price Administrator and thus became public 
documents. The disturbing implications of the required records doctrine are pointed out 
in Dixon, supra, at 554, 560-567. But cf. Meltzer, "Required Records, the McCarran Act, 
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 18 UNIV. CHI. L. REv 687 at 708-728 (1951). 
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federal immunity provisions have been in statutes providing for 
some form of economic regulation. 
The fact th~t until the present period federal immunity pro• 
visions have not been directed at the field of heresy increases in 
significance when we remember that the right of silence had its 
growth in this very field and that it made its greatest gains during 
the time of the Puritan opposition to then constituted authorities. 
It is not inappropriate to point out that the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures grew up in the same field. 
What the Puritans and Lilburne did in the 1600' s for the right to 
remain silent, John Wilkes did in the next century for the right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Coke had al-
ready said that a man's house was his castle.226 But it_ took Wilkes 
and No. 45 of his paper, the North Britain, to give content to the 
statement. This number came out in April 1763 and contained a 
biting criticism of George Hi's message to Parliament. The king's 
ministers regarded it as a seditious libel and Lord Halifax, one of 
the secretaries of state, issued a general warrant for the apprehen• 
sion of the authors, printers and publishers. This warrant was 
ruled to be illegal, and the various resulting actions against the 
king's messengers were estimated to have cost the government as 
much as I 00,000 pounds.227 Wilkes recovered 4000 pounds from 
Lord Halifax himself. Then in 1765, in Entinck v. Carrington,228 
Lord Camden, with the unanimous concurrence of the other judges 
of his court, ruled that general search warrants were illegal. To 
permit them, he re3<soned, "would be subversive of all the comforts 
of society.''229 Justice Bradley later stated, in his opinion for the 
court in Boyd v. United States,230 that Lord Camden's "great judg· 
ment on that occasion is considered as one of the landmarks of 
English liberty." Thereafter the elder Pitt, Lord Chatham, could 
declare eloquently: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid de-
fiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be frail-its roof may 
shake-the wind may blow through it-the storm may enter-the 
rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enterl-all his 
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! "231 
226 3 INsr. •162. In Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1603), 
the court stated: "That the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well 
for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose •••• " 
227 3 MAY, CONSTITIJTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 7th ed., 6, 7 (1882). 
228 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). 
229 Id. at 1066. 
230 116 U.S. 616 at 626 (1886). 
231 BROUGHAM, H1sroRICAL SKETCHES OF STATESMEN WHO FLOURISHED IN THE TIME OF 
GEORGE III 42 (1858). 
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It was this kind of regard for the dignity of the individual, plus 
the traditional English opposition to the inquisitional system, 
traits shown especially in the treatment accorded dissenters in 
religion and politics, that, together with the great reluctance of 
the Puritans to name their associates, led to the final establishment 
of the right of silence. Although today one cannot legally claim 
this right to protect an associate,232 District Judge Grosscup never-
theless correctly understood the history and circumstances of its 
growth when in the course of his opinion holding the Immunity 
Act of 1893 to be unconstitutional he expressed the fear that with 
such an act "the government could probe the secrets of every con-
versation, or society, by extending compulsory pardon to one of its 
participants, and thus turn him into an involuntary informer."233 
Those who submitted the Minority Report in the House on S. 16 
shared this view. They said: "By this device to compel testimony, 
we turn men of conscience into informers. This is nasty busi-
ness. "234 
Furthermore, the successful resistance of the English people to 
the inquisitional system was part of a yet larger picture, one which 
included additional individual rights such as those to bail, habeas 
corpus, a public trial, and to be confronted with the witnesses 
against one, as well as the successful struggle of the English people 
against the Stuarts and of the American colonists against George 
III, the rise of the idea of the supremacy of law, and the final su-
premacy of law over royal prerogative. The larger picture was 
also to contain the protection of various confidential relationships, 
such as that between attorney and client, and husband and wife, 
and the recognition of a general right of privacy. Important in-
strumentalities in the development of individual rights were a 
rather independent bench and bar, and a court and jury system. 
When Bentham,235 and Wigmore236 after him, explained the right 
of silence on the ground that the English people were so aroused 
over the abuses of power by the high commission and the court of 
star champer that they got rid not only of these courts but of their 
inquisitional methods as well, they did not take a comprehensive 
enough view of history. 
If one were to give a brief characterization of the English and 
232 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 867 (1951). 
233 United States v. James, (N.D. lll. 1894) 60 F. 257 at 264. 
234 H.R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 18 (1954). 
235 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, bk. 9, pt. 4, c. 8, PP· 241-245 {182i). 
236 8 EVIDENCE, !Id ed., §2250, p. 800 (1940). 
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American approach to deviants, and to people generally one would 
say that it tended to be equalitarian. We have a regard for human 
dignity. We treat people as adults rather than as children. This 
is one of the basic differences between us and the east. Our ap-
proach is a more mature one. The result is a comparatively in-
dependent citizenry, and a more or less representative form of 
government. 
The holding in Brown v. Walker,231 based as it is on an insuf-
ficient appreciation of the history and nature of the right of silence, 
should not have been extended beyond the field of economic reg-
ulation. Chief Judge Clark of the Second Circuit said in concur-
ring reluctantly in the affirmance of the Ullmann case: "I concur, 
but regretfully. For the steady and now precipitate erosion of the 
Fifth Amendment seems to me to have gone far beyond anything 
within•the conception of those justices of the Supreme Court who 
by the narrowest of margins first gave support to the trend in the 
1890s. And serious commentators have found this new statute 
peculiarly disturbing in policy and in law .... It undermines and 
so far forth nullifies one of the basic differences between our 
justice and that of systems we condemn, namely the principle that 
the individual shall not be forced to condemn himself."238 
Specifically, the holding in Brown v. Walker should not have 
been extended to the field of beliefs. If that means a different result 
in cases involving economic regulation than in those involving 
beliefs, that will not be out of character for us either. Contrary to 
what the communists would have the world believe, we place as 
high a value on the worth of the individual as any group on earth. 
We give considerably more latitude to the individual in the ex-
pression of his opinions than in the conduct of his business affairs. 
A judge who spoke for us most ably on this point was Justice 
Holmes, and of his opinions Justice Frankfurter wrote: "Accord-
ingly, Mr. Justice Holmes was far more ready to find legislative 
invasion where free inquiry was involved than in the debatable 
area of economics."230 
Those who submitted the Minority Report in the House on 
S. 16 drew substantially the distinction we have suggested. After 
referring to the powers of various special agencies of the executive 
branch of government to grant immunity, they said: "Further-
more, the functions of these agencies are generally related to the 
237161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
238 United States v. Ullmann, (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 760 at 763. 
239 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 at 95 (1949). 
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field of economic regulation where their inquiries touch more 
upon the rights of corporations, to which no privilege against in-
crimination attaches, than to the rights of individuals."240 Near 
the end of their report they added: "We are dealing here with ele-
ments of the First as well as the Fifth amendment of the Constitu-
tion. "241 
Dean Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School drew the 
distinction we are urging when he ·wrote: 
"Where matters of a man's belief or opinions or political 
views are essential elements of the charge, it may be m~st dif-
ficult to get evidence from sources other than the suspected or 
accused person himself. Hence, the significance of the priv-
ilege over the years has perhaps been greatest in connection 
with resistance to prosecution for such offenses as heresy or 
political crimes. In these areas the privilege against self-
incrimination has been a protection for freedom of thought 
and a hindrance to any government which might wish to pros-
ecute for thoughts and opinions alone."242 
In discussing the inferences to be drawn from a claim of a right 
of silence, he stressed the same distinction: 
". . . The question whether a bank teller stole funds en-
trusted to him is one sort of question. But the closer the ques-
tions asked get to the area of opinion and political belief, the 
less significant, I suggest to you, is the refusal to answer ques-
tions. Or, to put this another way, the more the interroga-
tion gets into what might be called the free-speech area of the 
First Amendment, the more difficult it is to come up surely 
with a sound inference from the refusal to answer a ques-
tion. "243 
If supporters of the new federal act point out that it applies to 
treason, sabotage and espionage as well as sedition, the answer is 
that charges of treason as well as sedition were the traditional way 
in which monarchs compelled conformity in politics and religion. 
Such charges were a favorite weapon of Henry VIII. 
If some of the supporters of the new federal act were to suggest 
that if the English people had been more harsh with the Puritans, 
the latter might never have come to power, the answer is that 
probably the very leniency of the English people kept their civil 
240 H.R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 12 (1954). 
241 Id. at 15. 
242 THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 8-9 (1955), quoted with approval by the dissent in 
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 at 449, n.3 (1956). 
248 Id. at 58-59. 
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war from being worse than it was and made possible the bloodless 
revolution of 1688 and the bill of rights of 1689. One can point 
to a country where the authorities used methods with dissenters that 
left little to be desired in the way of harshness-Russia-and with 
fearful results. The czars sent a steady trek of political exiles to 
Siberia. Ironically enough, in the decade when this trek was reach-
ing its height, from 1875-1885, Friedrich Engels was adding to 
Marxism the idea of the withering ·away of the state. The destruc-
tive concepts of Marxism flourished in the minds of the repressed 
nihilists, and the result was a ruthless as well as a bloody revolution. 
The new federal immunity act is a further step in the direction 
of an inquisitional system, and one which we ought not to have 
taken. 
Basis of the Right of Silence 
The new federal act, and immunity acts generally, are subject 
to a further general objection: they are contrary to the regard for 
the individual which led to the creation of a right of silence. As 
the dissent in the Ullmann case aptly put it, "The Fifth Amend-
ment protects the conscience and the dignity of the individual, as 
well as his safety and security, against the compulsion of govern-
ment."244 Or as Justice Field, quoting with approval these words 
of counsel, James C. Carter, in his day the leader of the American 
bar, put it in his dissenting opinion in Brown v. Walker,245 
" ... both the safeguard of the Constitution and the common-law 
rule spring alike from that sentiment of personal self-respect, lib-
erty, independence, and dignity, which has inhabited the breasts 
of English speaking peoples for centuries, and to save which they 
have always been ready to sacrifice many governmental facilities 
and conveniences .... "246 A reexamination of the growth of this 
right in the light of the knowledge which has accumulated since 
Wigmore first made his study, and a reappraisal of it in the light 
of the use that the communists have made of the inquisitional tech-
nique and the plethora of confessions they have obtained as a 
result, will enhance one's esteem of this right. 
Each new period of human history to some extent makes its 
own restatement of the past. This does not mean that facts are 
altered, but rather that new events and the increase of knowledge 
make us give a new evaluation to some facts which were indifferent-
ly treated before, and take note of others which were overlooked. 
244 350 U.S. 422 at 449 (1956). 
245 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
246 Id. at 632. 
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Over sixty years ago Wigmore did a comprehensive survey of 
the growth of the right to remain silent.247 He concluded that the 
first few hundred years of the growth of this right represented 
purely a jurisdictional struggle between the state and the church 
and between the common law courts and the ecclesiastical courts. 
The later researches of Mary Hume Maguire248 and Professor E. M. 
Morgan249 showed that more was involved, even in the early his-
tory, than simply disputes over the scope of the authority of various 
officials. The most important element that was involved was an 
opposition to the inquisitional technique as such. But Professor 
Morgan's study came too late for him and that of Mrs. Maguire he 
refused to take seriously.250 It is time for a new examination. 
When the Supreme Court in June 1949, on the occasion of 
invalidating confessions in three different cases from three different 
states, South Carolina, Pennsylvania and Indiana,251 commented, 
"Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system,''252 
it was referring to the thousand years and more of history with 
which we are here concerned. In primitive societies the important 
agency in the regulation of human affairs was not the state, or a 
king, or a feudal lord. Rather it was the kinship group. A per-
son's rights depended not on his relation to the state, or to a lord, 
but on his position in the kindred. Similarly, an offense was re-
garded not as against the state but as against the party injured or 
his kindred. If a life had been taken, the offense was against the 
slain person's kindred, and they were his avengers. Accordingly, 
in the centuries before the ll00's in England and the 1200's in 
France the prosecution of offenses ( except where the offender was 
caught in the act or as a result of a chase on a hue and cry) was in 
most instances by the person who had been injured or by his kin-
dred. 
Also, in those early times the methods for determining issues 
were completely different, except for the survival to the present 
time of the use of oaths, from anything we know today. The early 
modes of proof were three-fold: the ordeal; oaths of one's self and 
247 "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere," 5 HARV. L. R.Ev. 71 (1891). He enlarged upon 
his study in "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination; Its History," 15 HARv. L. R.Ev. 610 
(1902). This material was embodied in §2250 of his work on evidence. 
248 "Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio as Administered in the 
Ecclesiastical Court in England" in EssAYS IN HISTORY AND PoLmCAL THEORY IN HONOR 
OF CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN 199 (1936). 
249 Morgan, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 34 MINN. L. R.Ev. I (1949). 
250 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2250, n.l (1940). 
2;;1 Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68; ·Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62; Watts 
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49. 
2:>2 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 54. 
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one's kindred (or compurgation as later legal antiquaries, borrow-
ing a term from ecclesiastical sources, were to call it); and trial by 
battle.253 AU these modes of proof had one thing in common: they 
were irrational. They depended not on reasoning, but on a belief 
in magic. They all reflected primitive thinking. God would 
demonstrate where the truth lay. He would ·wreak his vengeance 
on those who swore falsely. He would choose the victor. 
In the 800's and the following centuries in Western Europe two 
changes slowly occurred in the treatment of deviants. The state 
gradually took over the prosecution of offenses, and the older 
modes of proof became obsolete. It was the accusational and in-
quisitional systems which supplanted the older modes of proof. 
The accusatorial method was developed by the state. It owes much 
to Henry II, a wise administrator, and one of the greatest of English 
kings (1154-1189). He laid the basis for the survival and growth 
of the accusatorial system in England by his extension of an in-
stitution which the Frankish kings created in the 800's, the inquiry 
of neighbors, the ancestor of our grand and petit juries. The in-
quisitional technique was created by the church. It was devised 
by Innocent III, an outstanding papal legislator, and one of the 
greatest of popes (1198-1216). The two systems represent basically 
opposite approaches in the treatment of deviants and fundamental-
ly different methods for the investigation and proof of offenses. 
Under the accusatorial method there is an insistence that the in-
vestigating authorities get their case from other sources than the 
mouth of the accused. Under the inquisitional system the in-
vestigators try to get their case from this very source. It is this 
difference which accounts for the fact that we do not have the 
quantity of confessions that communist regimes do. 
Looked at in one way the accusatorial method was centuries 
older even than Henry II, for it may be said that primitive tribal 
justice already had this characteristic. It was accusatorial in the 
sense that the state did not prosecute, and hence did not question, 
deviants. In England the administration of justice remained ac-
cusatorial because of the development of the grand and petit jury 
system. 
In the 800's, in Western Europe, tribal society was becoming 
feudal. With the Vikings attacking from the north and the 
253 Apparently trial by battle did not at first exist in England. The Normans under 
William the Conqueror brought it over in 1066. But then it had its day. 
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Saracens from the south, kinship ties gave way to the lord-man 
relationship. The authority of the state waxed; that of the kindred 
waned. After the Norman conquest feudalism in England be-
came an elaborately organized and symmetrical system due to 
William the Conqueror's enfeoffment of his captains. As the 
state's power grew, so too did its jurisdiction over offenses. One 
of the ways in which the state increased its jurisdiction in this area 
was by an extension of the king's peace. William the Conqueror 
announced that his peace included all men, English as well as 
Norman. 
In the 800's, too, the Frankish kings broke through the bounds 
of the old tribal customs and, where their finances were concerned, 
abandoned the older modes of proof. The customary moot hill 
courts with their magical, superstitious procedures were no 
longer good enough for the Frankish kings when their revenues 
were involved. They established a new procedure, one unknown 
to the old Germanic law. This procedure had the name of in-
quisitio patriae, more generally known as the enquete du pays, the 
inquiry of the country or the country-side-the inquiry of neigh-
bors. In 829 an ordinance of Louis I, le Debonnaire, or the Pious 
(814-840), the third and surviving son of Charlemagne, provided 
that every inquiry with reference to the royal fisc was to be by the 
inquisitio, the inquiry of neighbors. This kind of inquisitio is to 
be distinguished from the later inquisitio of the church, the inquiry 
by officials. It was the Frankish inquisitio which the Normans 
adopted and developed, and which became our grand and petit 
jury system. 
At first in England the inquiry of neighbors was this: a public 
official summoned a group of responsible neighbors, put them 
under oath, and asked them to give him a true answer to some 
question. It might be a question of fact; it might be a question of 
law; or it might be what we speak of as a mixed question of fact 
and law. Who owned certain land? What were the customs in 
their district? What were the local rights of the king? And the 
like. Henry II took this institution and step by step extended it, 
now to disputes like these and now like those, and now to find out 
whether any crimes had been committed, until in the course of 
time it became the usual one in the administration of justice. 
About 400 years after the Frankish kings started the inquiry 
of neighbors, Innocent III fashioned inquiry by officials. He de-
veloped this procedure in a series of decretals beginning in 1199, 
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possibly ll98, and perfected it in a decretal of the Fourth Lateran 
Council of 1215-1216.254 Under it an official, by virtue of his 
office (ex officio),255 had power to make a person before him take 
an oath to tell the truth to the full extent of his knowledge as to 
all things he would be questioned about. 
In setting up his new procedure, Innocent, following in the 
traces of the Roman law, provided for three forms of action: ac-
cusatio, denunciatio, and inquisitio. In accusatio an accuser 
formally brought suit and was subject to the talio in case of failure. 
In denunciatio a person gave information about an offense to the 
appropriate official but did not himself become a formal accuser 
or party to the suit. In inquisitio the inquisitor, without any 
denunciation, cited a suspect, having him imprisoned if necessary. 
Howev~r, under Innocent's decretals, the inquisitor was not sup-
posed to proceed by this third method without some basis, either 
common report ("per famam") or notorious suspicion ("per 
clainosam insinuationem" ). In practice the third form, the in-
quisitio, became the invariable rule. At the same time the safe-
guards which Innocent III provided were ignored.256 
Just as the inquiry of neighbors, so the inquiry by officials, was 
a radical departure from the old modes of proof, including com-
purgation. In compurgation one swore to a set formula. One's 
oath helpers swore, for instance, that their principal's oath was 
clean and unperjured. That was all there was to it. But under the 
inquisitional oath one swore to tell the truth in response to ques-
tions, substantially after the modern manner. It was this system 
which spread throughout Christendom and to the organs of the 
state on the mainland of Europe, beginning in France. The point 
of departure in France was the Ordinance of 1260 of St. Louis. By 
this ordiI_iance he forbade trial by battle in the king's courts, and 
254 Esmein finds the earliest instance of the inquisitio procedure in a decretal of 1198. 
HISTOIRE DE LA PROCEDURE" CRIMINELLE EN FRANCE (1882), translated in 5 CONTINENTAL 
LEGAL HISTORY SERIES 80 (1913). But Wigmore, Pollock and Maitland, Tanon, and 
Hinschius are of the opinion that the first reference to the inquisitio procedure as a 
generic method was in a decrelal of 1199. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2250, n. 28 (1940); 
2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 657, n.4 (1898). 
2ii5 This phrase, which became identified in England with the inquisitio procedure of 
the church, apparently derives from one of Innocent's decretals of 1199. 8 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE, 3d ed., §2250, n.28 (1940). 
250 For a full description of the inquisitional procedure of the church, both in theory 
and practice, see I LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 310-440 (1888); 
THE INQUISmON OF THE MIDDLE AGES 1-133 (1954). Hinschius also related that in the 
inquisitio procedure the safeguards came to be disregarded. 6 SYSTEM DES KATHOLISCHEN 
K.lRCHENKRECHTS MIT RUCKSICHT AUF DEUTSCHLAND 68-71 (1897). 
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substitu~ed for it a procedure which he borrowed from the prac-
tice of the ecclesiastical courts: witpesses were to appear before 
certain delegates of the judge and be questioned. These delegates 
were to question the witnesses separately and artfully ("subtile-
ment").257 
The difference between the inquisitio of the Frankish and 
English kings and the inquisitio of the church, between the inquiry 
of neighbors and the secret and artful questioning of witnesses by 
officials, was subtle yet fundamental. Under the inquiry of neigh-
bors it was the neighbors who sat in judgment; under inquiry by 
officials, it was some official. The inquiry of neighbors was to help 
in the development of a fairly independent and relatively more 
mature citizenry, and a more or less representative form of govern-
ment; inquiry by officials was not. Of cour~e, tp.e secret and artful 
questioning of witnesses was more rational than the old modes of 
proof.· Also, the use of secrecy need not necessarily have been an 
evil. After all, our grand jury proceedings are secret, too. The 
vice lay in the use of secret questioning, not by a grand jury, but 
by a professional class, at a time when safeguards for persons who 
stood accused had not yet been developed. In England those safe-
guards were developed in connection with the jury system. 
The English people resisted the oath ex officio, as the inquisi-
tional procedure came to be designated, precisely because it was 
inquisitional. Fundamentally, what was involved was a struggle 
between two different ways of dealing with deviants. Especially 
to the English and American people there was something improper 
about putting a person on oath and questioning him. They raised 
various objections to this procedure: one was entitled to be tried 
in one's vicinity; to be presented formally with the charges against 
one; to know one's accusers; one ought not to be questioned about 
the secret thoughts of one's heart; thought should be free; and 
last but not least, one was not bound to be one's own accuser. An 
important reason for insisting that one should not be made to ac-
cuse one's self was to avoid becoming an informer on members of 
one's family, and on one's friends and associates. The people who 
made these objections were also the ones who at the same time and 
in the same struggle developed various protective rights to those 
who stood accused, such as that to bail, habeas corpus, a public 
21!7 EsMEIN, HISTOIRE DE LA PROCEDURE CRIMINELLE EN FRANCE (1882), translated in 5 
CoNTINENTAL l.EcAL HISTORY SERIES 80 at 106 (1913). 
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trial, to be confronted with the witnesses against one, to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and to be represented by 
independent counsel of one's own choice. They secured for them-
selves a number of personal freedoms, such as that of speech and 
the press, as well as the right peaceably to assemble. They safe-
guarded from inquiry various confidential communications, be-
tween husband and wife, attorney and client, and, in this .country, 
doctor and patient, and priest and penitent. They evolved an in-
dividual right of privacy, a right to be let alone.258 It is relevant 
further to note that the attorney and client privilege went back to 
the reign of Elizabeth I,259 to a time shortly before the final strug-
gle for the successful establishment of the privilege against self-
incrimination began. Viewed in this light the struggle against the 
oath ex officio transcends jurisdictional questions. The privilege 
against self-incrimination becomes more than just that. It be-
comes in truth a right to remain silent. The English and Ameri-
can people accorded to the individual not only freedom of speech 
but also, under certain circumstances, a right of silence. 
There were three periods when the English people vigorously 
resisted the inquisitional technique. Characteristically the resist-
ance during each of these periods was to inquiries into either 
religious or political heresy. The first period began in 1246, when 
Robert Grosseteste, the crusading Bishop of Lincoln used the oath 
ex officio in a general inquisition throughout his extensive diocese. 
This was scarcely a decade after Cardinal Otto, papal legate, in-
troduced the oath ex officio into England. The second period was 
during the reign of Henry VIII, after another Bishop of Lincoln 
started hunting heresy. The third was during the reigns of Eliza-
beth I and the first two Stuarts, James I and Charles I. This time 
the opposition to the inquisitional oath was spearheaded by the 
Puritans. The Puritans and others then out of sympathy with the 
governing authorities made it plainer than had their predecessors 
that the objections to the oath ex officio were based not only on 
the fact that it enabled inquiry into the secret thoughts and knowl-
edge of a person's heart, but also made him into an informer on 
2~s The basic work on this point is of course the article by Warren and Brandeis, 
"The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. R.Ev. 193 (1890). For a recent case collecting many 
authorities, see Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, (D.C. Conn. 1953) ll6 F. Supp. 538. 
259 Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 62, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1576-1577); Kelway v. Kelway, Cary 
89, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (1579-1580); Dennis v. Codrington, Cary 100, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (1579-
1580). 
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his family, neighbors and friends. One of the Puritan leaders, 
James Morice, a lawyer and a member of Parliament, wrote a tract 
against the oath which was published in 1590, shortly after the 
last and final struggle against the inquisitional oath had begun. 
In it he explained that by the use of this oath the ecclesiastical 
judge could require a person "to accuse himselfe even of his most 
secret and inward thoughtes, or contrarie to christian charitie, yea 
humanitie it selfe, constrayning him to enforme against his na-
tural! parentes, dearest friends, and nearest neighbors, or to be-
wray with griefe of heart such matters of secrecie, as otherwise 
were inconvenient peradventure not honest to be revealed." He 
went on to tell how in the reign of Henry VIII the "bloudie 
Bishop" of Lincoln by the oath ex officio "constrayned the children 
to accuse their parentes, the parentes their naturall children, the 
wife her husbande, ·the husbande his wife, one brother and sister 
another."260 
In July 1590, when the Puritan minister, John Udall, refused 
to tell the high commission whether he was the author of a certain 
book he frankly explained: "My lord, I think the author, for any 
thing I know, did well, and I ,know that he is enquired after to be 
punished; and therefore I think it my duty to hinder the finding 
of him out, which I cannot do better than thus."261 Later when the 
oath was urged upon him he offered to take an oath of allegiance 
to the queen but refused to take the inquisitional oath, saying, 
". . . but to swear to accuse myself or others, I think you have no 
law for it."262 Yet another Puritan leader, the preacher, Thomas 
Cartwright, who was before the high commission in September 
1590, was reluctant to take the oath "lest by his answer upon oath 
in this case others might be prejudiced, who would refuse to an-
swer upon theirs."263 Daniel Neal in his History of the Puritans, 
in discussing the course of Cartwright and of fifteen more who fol-
lowed his example, stated: "The rest of Cartwright's brethren re-
fusing the oath for the same reason, viz., because they would not 
accuse themselves, nor bring their friends into trouble. . . . "264 
260 MORICE, A BRIEFE TREATISE OF OATHES 10 and 11 (1590). John Strype stated that 
Morice wrote a tract against the oath in 1590. 1 THE LIFE AND Acrs OF JOHN WHITGIFT 
•339 (1822). See 1 NEAL, THE HISI'ORY OF THE PURITANS 196 (Toulmin's ed., with addi-
tional notes by Choules, 1855). 
261 1 How. St. Tr. 1271 at 1274 (1590). 
262 Id. at 1275. 
263 1 STRYPE, THE LIFE AND Acrs OF JOHN WHITGIFT •333 (1822). 
264 1 NEAL, THE HISTORY OF THE PURITANS 194 (Toulmin, 1855). 
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There were of course those who confessed and disclosed who at-
tended their meetings. As to them Neal commented," ... but the 
worst part of their confession was their discovering the names of 
the brethren that were present, which brought them into 
trouble."265 Earlier in his work he related: "When the prisoners 
were brought to the bar, the court immediately tendered them the 
oath to answer all questions to the best of their knowledge, by 
which they were obliged not only to accuse themselves, but fre-
quently to bring their relations and friends into trouble."266 One 
will note that in all this, nothing was said of the use of any torture. 
When the lord keeper in 1637 asked John Lilburne, a leader 
of the Levellers, who was before the court of star chamber on a 
charge of importing certain objectionable books, why he refused 
to take the oath, he answered: "My honourable Lord, I have an-
swered fully before sir John Banks to all things that belong to me 
to answer unto: and for other things, which concern other men, I 
have nothing to do with them." The lord keeper persisted: "But 
why do you refuse to take the Star-Chamber oath?" Lilburne 
responded: " ... though I had fully answered all things that belong 
to me to answer unto . . . yet that would not satisfy and give con-
tent, but other things were put unto me, concerning other men, 
to insnare me, and get further matter against me .... "267 
At the time Archbishop John Whitgift, who became head of 
the High Commission in 1583, and his fellow commissioners 
started on their crusade against heresy this much was fairly well 
established: one was entitled to be accused formally and to know 
the charges; and one did not have to submit to inquiry about one's 
secret thoughts and deeds. Also as a matter of practice one usually 
knew who one's accusers were and, in a nonpolitical criminal case, 
was confronted with them. Of course, once one had been formally 
charged one could be and was questioned. This was true in lay 
as well as ecclesiastical proceedings. So far as questioning an ac-
cused was concerned, one of the main differences between a lay 
criminal trial and a case before the high commission was that in a 
lay criminal trial a defendant was not put under oath. However, 
from a _rational point of view this difference is not a substantial one: 
questioning is questioning whether one is put under oath _or not. 
265 Id. at 196. 
266 Id. at 162-163. 
267 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 at 1321 (1637). 
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But if one had the right to be formally and openly charged and 
·could not be questioned on one's secret thoughts and deeds, and if 
one as a matter of practice usually knew one's accusers and was 
confronted with them, the next step followed naturally: one could 
not be made to accuse one's self. This was the step the English 
people took to resist the pursuit of heresy which Whitgift and his 
:successors carried on. 
In composing their argument against the oath ex officio the 
Puritans and their Ia-wyers made use of a phrase which they bor-
rowed from an opinion of nine English canonists, one of whom was 
Richard Cosin, a leading civil lawyer. These canonists about the 
middle of Elizabeth I's reign prepared a short treatment on the 
practice in ecclesiastical courts in England and the use of the oath 
ex officio. They conceded that "no man may be urged to bewray 
himself in hidden and secret crimes; or simply therein to accuse 
himself."268 Then they discussed the inquisitio procedure of the 
church, in the course of which they stated the safeguards which 
theoretically accompanied it: "Licet nemo tenetur seipsum 
prodere; tamen proditus per famam, tenetur seipsum ostendere, 
utrum possit suam innocentiam ostendere, et seipsum purgare.''269 
The Puritans and their counsel took the "nemo tenetur seipsum 
prodere" and in the course of the next century made it into a house-
hold phrase, in the colonies as well as in the mother country. At 
first they tied it to the "nisi in causis matrimonialibus vel testamen-
tariis" of the order of 1246 of Henry III to Grosseteste and the 
"Prohibitio formata de statuto articuli cleri" of Edward II (1307-
1327);2•0 but after 1640, the year the Long Parliament convened, a 
turning point year in an eventful century for the English people, 
the phrase was used by itself. On every hand and in every court 
people simply claimed that no one was bound to be his own accuser. 
A striking claim of privilege occurred in 1670 in the trial of 
William Penn and William Mead, who were indicted for preach-
ing to~ tumultuous assembly and disturbing the peace. The Penn 
in this case was the one who later founded Pennsylvania. Mead in 
refusing to answer the recorder's question whether he was present 
268 3 Sm.YJ>E, THE LIFE AND ACTS OF JOHN WHITCIFr appx. at •136 (1822). 
269 Id. at •137. "Though no one is bound to become his own accuser, yet when once 
a man has been accused by general report, he is bound to show whether he can prove his 
innocence and to vindicate himself." See Wigmore, "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere," 5 
HAR.v. L. REv. 71 at 83 (1891). 
270 See articles cited in notes 247 and 249 supra. 
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at the meeting, stated vividly: "It is a maxim of your own law, 
'Nemo tenetur accusare seipsum,' which if it be not true Latin, I 
am sure it is true English, 'That no man is bound to accuse him-
self.' And why dost thou offer to insnare me with such a question?" 
The recorder answered, "Sir, hold your tongue, I did not go about 
to insnare you.''271 The jurors returned a verdict in which they 
stated that Penn and Mead were guilty of speaking but refused to 
find them guilty of what they were charged. The court tried to 
browbeat the jurors into a verdict of guilty, with the result that 
they ended up finding both Penn and Mead not guilty.272 
It was this history and this approach to deviants which was em-
bodied in the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The same approach has continued to the present time, in 
England as well as this country. In 1848 Parliament passed a 
statute, known as Sir John Jervis' Act, which specifically required 
a justice of the peace to advise an accused person before him in a 
preliminary proceeding of his right to remain silent at such an 
examination. The act provided that he "shall say to him these 
Words, or Words to the like Effect: 'Having heard the Evidence, 
do you wish to say anything in answer to the Charge?-you are not 
obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but whatever 
you say will be taken down in Writing, and may be given in 
Evidence against you at your 'Trial' ... .''278 
In 1912 the judges at the request of the Home Secretary drew 
up some rules as guides for police officers. These rules provided 
in part: 
"2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to 
charge a person with a crime he should first caution such per-
son before asking any questions or any further questions as 
the case may be: 
2716 How. St. Tr. 951 at 957-958 (1670). 
212 Id. at 966. The court was incensed at the verdict of not guilty, fined the jurors 40 
marks apiece, and had them committed until the fine was paid. Id. at 967-968. There-
upon the jurors got a writ of habeas corpus returnable to the court of common pleas and 
were discharged. Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 6 How. St. Tr. 999 
(1670). The court unanimously decided that their commitment was illegal. The opinion 
of the court on the request of all the judges was by Chief Justice Sir John Vaughan. On 
appeal the judgment was reversed on the ground that the case, being a criminal one, was 
not cognizable by the court of common pleas. I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
lid ed., 345 (1922). However, Vaughan's opinion was such a sound one that it was there-
after regarded as representing the law. A newsletter account of the opinion stated that it 
, was "business of great concernment and much talked of." 8 ENGLISH · HISTo1t1CAL Docu-
MENTS 86 (1953). Thus trial jurors indeed became judges of the facts. 
278 11 &: 12 Viet., c. 42, §18 (1848). 
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"3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without 
the usual caution being first administered. 
"4. If the prisoner wishes to volunteer any statement the 
usual caution should be administered .... "274 
These rules are known as the Judges' Rules. Subsequently, 
the judges issued some more. The first sentence of Rule 7 
specified: "A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be 
cross-examined, and no questions should be put to him about it 
except for the purpose of removing ambiguity in what he has 
actually said."275 
In 1929 a Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, 
which had been appointed the preceding year, made a report in 
which it recommended, among other things: 
"Questioning of Persons in Custody. 
(xlviii) a rigid instruction should be issued to the Police that 
no questioning of a prisoner, or a 'person in custody,' about 
any crime or offence with which he is, or may be, charged, 
should be permitted. This does not exclude questions to re-
move elementary and obvious ambiguities in voluntary state-
ments, under No. (7) of the Judges' Rules, but the prohibition 
should cover all persons who, although not in custody, have 
been charged and are out on bail while awaiting trial."276 
A case and an anecdote will illustrate the English approach 
to deviants. In 1935 in the case of Rattenbury and Stoner, who 
were on trial for murder, the former, whose husband had been the 
victim, had stated at the time of her arrest that she had done it and 
that the murder weapon had been a mallet. The arresting officer 
did not follow up these .statements with any question. Defense 
counsel asked him why not, and this colloquy took place: 
"Mr. Justice Humphreys: Do you really suggest, Mr. 
O'Connor, if after a woman has said-believe it or not-that 
she was a party to a crime like this, the police officer would be 
justified in cross-examining her at all? 
"Mr. O'Connor: I accept your lordship's suggestion at once, 
and apologise for the question."277 
274 They are set out in a note to Rex v. Voisin, (1918] l K.B. 531 at 539, n.3. 
276 REPoRT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURES 71 n. (Cmd. 
3297, 1929). 
276 Id. at IIS. 
277 TRIAL OF RATTENBURY AND STONER 126-127 (Jesse ed. 1935). 
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The anecdote is about a British constable on the witness stand 
who was asked whether it was not true that the accused had made 
a statement. He answered: "No: he was beginning to do so; but 
I knew my duty better, and I prevented him."278 
In this country seven American states, Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire, had put a guarantee of the right to remain silent in 
their constitutions or bills of rights before the ad.option of the 
Fifth Amendment.279 Today, in addition to the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee of this right, all but two states, Iowa and New 
Jersey, have similar constitutional provisions; and in these two 
states this right also obtains, in one, Iowa, by judicial decision,280-
and in the other by statute as well as judicial decision.281 Many 
states have statutory as well as constitutional provisions.282 
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of a right of 
silence is one provision which the federal courts have interpreted 
even more liberally than the provisions of the First Amendment. 
For instance, although the Fifth Amendment's guarantee relates by 
its terms to a criminal case, the Supreme Court in Counselman v. 
Hitchcock283 by a liberal interpretation extended it to a grand jury 
proceeding, pointing out through Justice Blatchford that this pro-
vision "must have a broad construction in favor of the right which 
it was intended to secure."284 Recent cases, including two in the 
Supreme Court, Emspak v. United States285 and Quinn v. United 
States,286 have applied it to proceedings before congressional com-
mittees.287 The Supreme Court cases involved Thomas Quinn 
and Julius Emspak, members of the Unit~d Electrical Workers. 
In both cases the Court not only sustained claims of the privilege 
278 FORSYTH, HoRTENSIUS nm ADVOCATE 282, n.l (1882). 
279 Pittman, "The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in America," 21 VA. L. REv. 763 at 764-765 (1935). 
280 State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902). See Koenck v. Cooney, 244 
Iowa 153 at 157, 55 N.W. (2d) 269 (1952). 
281 See State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 117 A. (2d) 499 (1955); In re Pillo, 11 N.J. ·a, 93 A. 
(2d) 176 (1952); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A. (2d) 141 (1949); State v. Grundy, 136 
N.J.L. 96 at 97, 54 A. (2d) 793 (1947); State v. Miller, 71 N.J.L. 527 at 532, 60 A. 202 
(1904); State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619 at 622, 55 A. 743 (1903). The statutory provi-
sions are now N.J. Stat. Ann. (1951) §2A:81-5 and 6. 
282 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2252, n.3 (1940). 
283 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
284 Id. at 562. 
285 349 U.S. 190 (1955), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1952) 203 F. (2d) 5'l. 
286 349 U.S. 155 (1955), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1952) 203 F. (2d) 20. 
287 See note 12 supra (55 MICH. L. REv. 163 at 166). 
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before a congressional committee, but did so even though they 
were based only secondarily on the Fifth Amendment. Emspak. 
in refusing to answer certain questions explained: "Because of the 
hysteria, I think it is my duty to endeavor to protect the rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution, primarily the first amendment, 
supplemented by the fifth. This Committee will corrupt those 
rights."288 Quinn adopted the statement of another,289 Thomas J. 
Fitzpatrick, a member of his union. Fitzpatrick commented at 
one point: "This is a protection of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution, supplemented by the Fifth Amendment." Another 
time he said: "I stand on the protection of the Constitution, the 
First and Fifth Amendments."290 The opinions in both cases were 
by Chief Justice Warren. In the Quinn case, after pointing out 
that the guarantees in the federal Constitution were to be accorded 
a liberal construction he continued: "Such liberal construction is 
particularly warranted in a _prosecution of a witness for a refusal 
to answer, since the respect normally accorded the privilege is then 
buttressed by the presumption of innocence accorded a defendant 
in a criminal trial. To apply the privilege narrowly or begrudg-
ingly-to treat it as an historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated 
-is to ignore its development and purpose."291 • 
In line with this sympathetic application of the Fifth Amend-
ment's right of silence, the Supreme Court, at the last term, in 
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education292 held that section 903 
of New York City's charter was invalid because it made the claim 
of a right of silence an automatic basis for the termination of one's 
employment. Slochower was an associate professor of German at 
Brooklyn College. The Court ruled: " ... The privilege against 
self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its 
exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt 
or a conclusive presumption of perjury .... There has not been 
the 'protection of the individual against arbitrary action' which 
Mr. Justice Cardozo characterized as the very essence of due pro-
cess."203 
288 349 U.S. 190 at 193, n.3 (1955). (Italics the Court's.) 
289 349 U.S. 155 at 158, and n.8 (1955). 
290 203 F. (2d) 20 at 23 (1952). Fitzpatrick was held properly to have claimed his 
Fifth Amendment privilege. United States v. Fitzpatrick, (D.C. D.C. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 491. 
291 349 U.S. 155 at 162 (1955). 
292 350 U.S. 551 (1956), reversing Daniman v. Board of Education, 306 N.Y. 532, I 19 
N.E. (2d) 373 (1954). 
298 Id. at 557 and 559. 
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The federal courts have interpreted the Fifth Amendment's 
guarantee of a right of silence in the spirit of Justice Bradley's 
comment in Boyd v. United States:294 
'' ... And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's 
oath, or compelling the production of his private books and 
papers, to convict him of crime or to forfeit his property, is con-
trary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to 
the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts 
of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; 
but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty 
and personal freedom. "295 
They have interpreted it in the spirit of Justice Rutledge's ob-
servation in 1942 while on the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit in Woods v. United States:296 
" ... With world events running as they have been, there is 
special reason at this time for not relaxing the old personal 
freedoms won, as this one was, through centuries of struggle. 
Men now in concentration camps could speak to the value of 
such a privilege, if it were or had been theirs. There is in it 
the wisdom of centuries, if not that of decades. 
"Large in this is a sense of fairness to the person accused, a 
respect for his individual integrity, in accusation or even in 
guilt. But larger still is the sense of the court's own part in 
justice and ~ts administration. By this we mean the sense of 
the citizen as well as of the court itself .... "297 
In the past half decade the federal courts have sustained a 
claim of the right of silence in more than fifty reported cases,298 
and many more unreported ones. Most of the persons under at-
tack were believed or felt to be communists. A number were per-
sons whom the Kefauver Committee sought to interrogate and who 
294116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
295 Id. at 631-632. 
296 (D.C. D.C. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 265. . 
297 Id. at 278-279. Starkie explained that the privilege was based on a principle of 
humanity as well as of policy; of humanity because any other course would "extort a 
confession of the truth by a kind of duress, every species and degree of which the law 
abhors." EVIDENCE, 10th Am. ed., •41 (1876). 
298 Trock v. United States, 351 U.S. 976 (1956); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 
(1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Singleton v. United States, 343 U.S. 
944 (1952); Brunner v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1952); Greenberg v. United States, 
343 U.S. 918 (1952); Greenberg v. United States, 341 U.S. 944 (1951); Hoffman v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Irving Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Patricia 
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Estes v. Potter, (5th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 865, 
cert. den. 340 U.S. 920 (1951); Kasinowitz v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 632, 
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were accused of being racketeers. In a case involving suspected 
communists, Judge Delbert E. Metzger in Hawaii declared: "And 
I can't see any actual difference, whether the proceeding was be-
fore a grand jury or committee of the House of Representatives, 
and any other inquisitive body . . . the Constitution stands there 
like the rock of Gibraltar. It has the same force and effect, to my 
mind, whether a proceeding is before a grand jury or any other 
body.''299 In a case involving a suspected racketeer, Judge Herbert 
F. Goodrich, in writing the opinion for the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit in Philadelphia commented: "If our conclusion 
permits, in the individual case, a rascal to go unwhipped or a vil-
lain unhung, it is because Americans have thought it better policy 
to lose a conviction now and then than to force a conviction from 
the defendant's own mouth."300 
In another recent case301 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in holding a state prisoner entitled to a ·writ of habeas 
corpus because of his conviction in a state court proceeding on 
confessions that the court deemed inadmissible, said, through Judge 
Jerome N. Frank: 
" ... · It has no significance that in this case we must assume 
there was no physical brutality. For psychological torture 
may be far more cruel, far more symptomatic of sadism. Many 
a man who can endure beatings will yield to fatigue. To keep 
a man awake beyond the point of exhaustion, while constantly 
cert. den. 340 U.S. 920 (1951); Ballantyne v. United States, (5th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 657; 
United States v. Courtney, (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 921; United States v. Gordon, (2d 
Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 916; United States v. Rosen, (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 187, cert. 
den. 338 U.S. 851 (1949); Powell v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 269; Krog-
mann v. United States, (6th Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 220; Carroll v. Savoretti, (5th Cir. 1955) 
220 F. (2d) 910; Daly v. United States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 232; Mallie v. United 
States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 225; Kiewal v. United States, (8th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 
I; United States v. Coffey, (3d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 438; United States v. Girgenti, (3d 
Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 218; Doran v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 489; Alex• 
ander v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 480; Application of House, (N.D. Cal. 
1956) 144 F. Supp. 95; United States v. Hoag, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 142 F. Supp. 667; Applica· 
tion of Daniels, (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 322; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Logsdon, 
(W.D. Ky. 1955) 18 F.R.D. 57; United States v. Vadner, (E.D. Pa. 1954) 119 F. Supp. 330; 
United States v. Malone, (N.D. Cal. 1953) 111 F. Supp. 37; In re Friedman, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 
104 F. Supp. 419; United States v. Steffen, (N.D. Cal. 1951) 103 F. Supp. 415; and cases 
cited note 12 supra. But cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (doctrine of 
waiver). 
299 United States v. Yukio Abe, (D.C. Hawaii, Jan. 16, 1951) 19 U.S. Law Week 2321, 
2322. 
800United States v. Girgenti, (3d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 218 at 221. 
801 United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, (2d Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 698, cert. 
den. 350 U.S. 896 (1955). Cf. Brock v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 681. 
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pummelling him with questions is to degrade him, to strip him 
of human dignity, to deprive him of the will to resist, to 
make him a pitiable creature mastered by the single desire-
at all costs to be free of torment. Any member of this or any 
other court, to escape such anguish would admit to almost any 
crime. Indeed, the infliction of such psychological punish-
ment is more reprehensible than a physical attack: It leaves no 
discernible marks on the victim. Because it is thus concealed, 
it has, under the brutalitarian regimes, become the favorite 
weapon of the secret police, bent on procuring confe~sions 
as a means of convicting the innocent."302 
A long view establishes that the right of silence grew steadily 
from the early English opposition to the inquisitional technique. 
The insistence on being formally presented with charges and on 
knowing one's accusers, to which was added the practice of con-
frontation, led naturally and logically to the position that one was 
not bound to accuse one's self. Thus under our system deviants 
acquired a right of silence. The four dissenters (Justices Shiras, 
Gray, White and Field) in Brown v. Walker,3°3 the first federal 
Supreme Court decision sustaining the government's position un-
der an immunity act, and the two dissenters (Justices Douglas and 
Black) in United States v. Ullmann,304 turn out to have had a 
better understanding of this right than the majority. A proper 
regard for the nature of this right should lead one to the position 
which Justice Douglas took in writing the dissent in the Ullmann 
case: "My view is that the Framers put it beyond the power of 
Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes .... The critical 
point is that the Constitution places the right of silence beyond the 
reach of government."30 r; Especially should this be true in the 
area of heresy, the very area in which this right had its growth. 
Utility of Immunity Acts 
Apart from constitutional and policy objections to immunity 
acts, there is a question as to their utility. A study of confessions 
802 Id. at 701. 
303161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
804 350 U.S. 422 (1956). . 
305 Id. at 445 and 454. Compare Chief Judge Magruder's statement in Maffie v. United 
States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 225 at 227 (one of the cases arising out of a grand jury 
investigation into the Brink's robbery in Boston in 1950): " •.• If it be thought that the 
privilege is outmoded in the conditions of this modem age, then the thing to do is to take 
it out of the Constitution, not to whittle it down by the subtle encroachments of judicial 
opinion." 
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indicates that the results expected from such statutes may be large-
ly illusory. A majority of deviants will confess without them. On 
the other hand, confirmed rebels will not confess even with them. 
For example, in the Rosenberg3°6 case, involving espionage, Harry 
Gold and David Greenglass confessed without any immunity 
statute, but Julius and Ethel Rosenberg did not confess and would 
not have done so even if there had been an immunity statute with 
a death penalty attached to it. 
For the purpose of detecting the authors of forbidden acts im-
munity statutes are not necessary, because human beings whether 
innocent or guilty of the acts in question have a compulsion to 
confess to something in any event. Confessions have an appeal to 
those that give them and an interest for the rest of us. Why did 
the Catholic church progress? One of the reasons was the practice 
of auricular confession, another of the tremendous changes of 
Innocent III, who also devised the inquisitional technique. Why 
did Parson Weems' fictional story about the boy George Washing-
ton chopping down his father's cherry tree become universally 
popular in this country? Because it involved a confession. Why 
have a majority of the guilty as well as many of the innocent con-
fessed to the commission of offenses? Because of the compulsion 
to confess. How have the communists obtained such a multitude 
of confessions, many of which they are now confessing to be false? 
In part it is because of this same compulsion. No human char-
acteristic is more general than the compulsion to confess. There 
are confessions in court and out of court, in church and out of 
church, in life and in literature, and yet a multitude of others. 
There are those which are consciously given and those which are 
unconsciously supplied. Even the common human failing of talk-
ing too much involves the same compulsion. 
It may come as a surprise to many, but the majority of defend-
ants in criminal cases enter pleas of guilty or comparable pleas. In 
the 86 United States district courts having purely federal jurisdic-
tion the number of defendants in such cases during the seven-year 
period ending June 30, 1954 who pleaded either guilty or nolo 
contendere amounted to the surprising figure of 224,920 out of a 
total of 268,620. Of the remainder, 23,274 were dismissed, 6,988 
806 United States v. Rosenberg, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 583, cert. den. 344 U.S. 838 
(1952), stay of execution granted 346 U.S. 313 (1953) Gustice Douglas), stay of execution 
vacated, 346 U.S. 273 (1953). 
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were acquitted, and 13,438 were convicted.307 Reduced to per-
centages this means, if one excludes the defendants who were dis-
missed, the astounding figure of 91.67 percent for those• who 
pleaded either guilty or nolo contendere. If one includes the 
defendants who were dismissed the figure becomes 83. 70 percent. 
These figures exclude those charged as juvenile delinquents but 
include immigration cases. The immigration cases were almost 
entirely confined to the five federal districts touching the Mexican 
border and the pleas of guilty of defendants in these cases amounted 
to almost 98 percent. If immigration cases are omitted the figure 
becomes 87 .67 percent, if one excludes the defendants who were 
dismissed, and 77.16 percent, if one includes them. The story in 
our state courts cannot be far different, although here one is handi-
capped by a lack of statistics. Some of the best state court statistics 
are now being kept by the Administrative Office of the Courts of 
New Jersey, but even these are not yet as good as the federal statis-
tics. According to the New Jersey statistics it would appear that in 
the three-year period ending August 31, 1954 the number of de-
fendants who pleaded either guilty or non vult exceeded by more 
than two and a half times the number who went to trial.308 
Because of the compulsion to confess, many communists and ex-
communists have confessed: communists in communist countries 
and ex-communists here. We are not aware of most of the ex-com-
munist confessants in this country, for we do not hear about them. 
They usually acquire a status of confidential informants and secret 
witnesses-there are many types of determinations today, such as 
those relating to loyalty and security questions, the status of aliens, 
draft classifications, and the black.listing of organizations in which 
one has not to date been held entitled to face one's accusers.309 
307 These figures came from information supplied me by the Administrative Office ot 
the United States Courts in communications of June 5, 1953 and December 16, 1954. 
sos An estimate based on information supplied me by the Administrative Office of the 
Courts in communications of June II, 1953 and December IO, 1954. The New Jersey sta• 
tistics are compiled in the form of •·cases." A case is a separate charge against an individ• 
ual defendant. Thus IO charges against one defendant equal IO cases, and one charge 
against IO defendants equals IO cases. For the two-year period ending August 31, 1954 
the number of cases in which there were pleas either of guilty or non vult amounted to 
7209, whereas the number of cases that went to trial amounted but to 2725. 
300 Washington v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 923 (1951), affirming 182 F. (2d) 375 (1950) 
(loyalty investigation); Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), affirming 182 F. (2d) 46 
(1950) (ibid); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) 
(attorney general's blacklist of organizations, compiled without any hearings); Adler v. 
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (Feinberg Law of New York, relating to the 
public school system, which provided that the board of regents was to establish its own 
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However, a number of ex-communists have appeared as witnesses 
in public hearings of legislative committees or have been used as 
witnesses against their former associates in criminal and other 
cases, and these individuals we do know about. The three such 
who have been the most publicized are Louis F. Budenz, Elizabeth 
T. Bentley, and Whittaker Chambers. These three have confessed 
to all manner of offenses, and named many former associates. 
Moreover, as time went on, their stories grew. Take, for example, 
Budenz. First he wrote a book, This Is My Story, published in 
194 7. Then he testified on three separate occasions-in 194 7 be-
fore the House Committee on Education and Labor, in 1948 in a 
perjury case, and in 1950 in a retrial of the same case, against 
Harold Roland Christoffel,310 a labor leader in Milwaukee, Wis-
consin. In his book he did not mention Christoffel at all. By the 
time of the first perjury trial he had made Christoffel into one of 
the key revolutionaries in this country and party to a plot to over-
throw our government by force and violence. At the second trial 
he added still more details to those he had given at the first one. 
Now of course a witness may actually have his recollection refreshed. 
However, one cannot but wonder in such cases as that of Budenz 
how much was actual recollection and how much was imagined 
recollection in order to accommodate and please our authorities. 
At any rate they all confessed to the commission of offenses and 
named former associates.311 
'\Ve not only have ex-communists who confessed, but we also 
have those who confessed and then confessed that their confessions 
blacklist of organizations and in so doing to make use of any similar authorized blacklist 
of any federal agency or authority); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. M_ezei, 345 U.S. 
206 (1953) (alien resident of this country seeking to return after a trip abroad held en-
titled to no hearing at all); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 
(1950) (alien war bride held entitled to no hearing); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 
(1948) (alien ordered banished without ·a hearing); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) 
(alien denied bail without a hearing); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. I (1953) (draft 
status of conscientious objector); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (exercise of attorney 
general's discretionary power of suspension of deportation of an alien). 
810 Christoffel's first conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in 
the last opinion which Justice Murphy wrote. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 
(1949) reversing (D.C. Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 1004. The Supreme Court divided five to 
four. On a retrial Christoffel was convicted again. He again appealed and the Supreme 
Court again sent the case back to the trial court, but this time for re-sentencing rather 
than another trial. Christoffel v. United States, 345 U.S. 947 (1953), vacating judgment, 
(D.C. Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 734. For a discussion of the first Christoffel trial, see ROGGE, 
OUR VANISHING CIVIL LIBERTIES, C. 15 (1949). . 
s11 On Chambers, see his book WrrNESS (1952); and Comrn, A GENERATION ON TIUAL 
(1950). 
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were false. Examples are Harvey Matusow, Mrs. Marie Natwig, 
Lowell Watson and David Brown. Indeed, Matusow's different 
stories have added to the government's difficulties in its efforts to 
deal with subversion. Because of his alleged false testimony and 
that of two other government witnesses, Paul Crouch and Man-
ning Johnson, the Supreme Court at the last term in Communist 
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board312 refused to sustain 
holdings in favor of the government, and sent the case back to the 
Subversive Activities Control Board for reconsideration. This 
case was the first one under Title I of the Internal Security Act of 
1950. Title I was officially designated as the Subversive Activities 
Control Act of 1950, and required "Communist-action" and "Com-
munist-front" organizations to register with the attorney general. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 
two-to-one decision sustained its validity.313 Also because of Matu-
sow's recantations two of the convicted defendants in the second 
Foley Square Smith Act prosecution against leaders of the Ameri-
can Communist Party obtained a new trial.314 
Ex-communist confessants and other informants have in all 
likelihood already told the government most of the story of the 
communist conspiracy which can be obtained from persons in this 
country. Indeed of the confessions of ex-communists at this point 
we would seem to have enough and to spare. What part of the 
small balance of the story that remains to be told can be obtained 
from those who have not yet talked is problematical, and so is its 
worth. The ones who have so far refused to talk are largely con-
firmed rebels. A number of them, like Julius and Ethel Rosen-
812 351 U.S. 115 (1956), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1954) 223 F. (2d) 531. 
313 It would seem, however, that on the constitutional question the dissenting judge, 
David L. Bazelon, had the better of the argument: "Suppose an Act of Congress required 
bands of bank robbers to file with the Attorney General statements of their memberships 
and activities, and imposed criminal penalties upon their leaders and members for failure. 
to do so. Such an Act would compel individuals to disclose their connection with a crim-
inal conspiracy. No argument could reconcile such an Act with the Fifth Amendment's 
command .... " (D.C. Cir. 1954) 223 F. (2d) 531 at 576. 
814 United States v. Flynn, (S.D. N.Y. 1955) 130 F. Supp. 412. They were Alexander 
Trachtenberg and George Blake Charney. In United States v. Flynn, (S.D. N.Y. 1955) 131 
F. Supp. 742, the court denied a motion of the remaining eleven convicted defendants for 
reargument, of their motion for a new trial. In 1956 Trachtenberg and Charney were 
retried and again convicted. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I, 1956, p. 1:3, p. 52:3. 
Matusow and Natwig were convicted of perjury. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1956, p. 7:5-6; 
Natwig v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 694. Matusow was also held in 
contempt of court in Texas for recanting testimony which he had previously given there, 
but this.judgment was reversed on appeal. Matusow v. United States, (5th Cir. 1956) 229 F. 
(2d) 335. 
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berg, would not talk under any circumstances. An immunity act 
may make a few talk who otherwise would not. If we had an in-
quisitional system such as the communists do we could get still 
more confessions, but would we want them? Certainly we should 
want no additional confessions such as those of Harvey Matusow. 
Even more surely we should want no confessions like those of 
Laszlo Rajk, formerly minister of the interior and then minister 
of foreign affairs of Hungary, and numerous others which the com-
m~mists are now admitting to be false. 
The futility of the new federal act so far as congressional wit-
nesses are concerned was ably described in the Minority Report in 
the House on S. 16: 
''What legislative lack does section (a) and (b) of the re-
ported bill fill? ... It is not the function of Congress to prepare 
cases for prosecution. It is not the function of Congress to 
relieve the executive branch of the Government of its constitu-
tional responsibility of law enforcement. When a committee 
of Congress investigates, it does so to gather evidence for its 
own purposes, that of legislating wisely and adequately. The 
investigations of Pearl Harbor, Teapot Dome, the work of the 
Truman Defense Committee and the LaFollette Civil Liber-
ties Committee did not suffer for lack of congressional power 
to immunize witnesses. In the areas of treason, sabotage, 
espionage, ... the Communist conspiracy, etc., the Congress 
has not heretofore hesitated to legislate, though lacking the 
power of immunization, session after session in its history. 
"The sought-after evidence of the recalcitrant witness can 
now give us-what? More of the same thing? The facts of 
the evil and danger of the international Communist con-
spiracy have been spread before the Congress by a march of 
voluntary witnesses, ranging from employees of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to the ubiquitous ex-Communists. 
Beyond that lie only the exposure and prosecution of guilt, 
which is the business of the executive."315 
The experience of the Department of Justice to date under 
the new act would seem to bear out the views in the Minority Re-
port on the act's worth. When the decision in the Ullmann case 
became final the defendant advised the district court that he wanted 
to purge his contempt by appearing before the grand jury and 
answeri~g the questions previously put to him. Ullmann was a 
sui H.R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 12 (1954). 
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former Treasury Department official whom Elizabeth Bentley had 
linked with an espionage ring which Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, 
another Treasury·Department official, assertedly headed. Another 
alleged member of this ring was Harry Dexter White. Ullmann, 
after his purging grand jury appearance, issued this statement to 
the press: 
" ... As I have done in the past, I have again denied partic-
ipating in espionage and have denied knowing anyone who 
has. I have denied ever being a member of the Communist 
party and have denied knowledge of Communist party- ac-
tivities on the part of others. 
"I have specifically denied knowledge of the things which 
my former superior, the late Harry Dexter White, has· been 
charged with-and believe, in fact, that he was a great and 
faithful public servant."316 
Now that the authorities had his answers they were not happy 
with them. The grand jury wanted his contempt sentence held 
over his head until he gave more satisfactory ones. However, 
Judge Weinfeld told them that if they felt Ullmann had committed 
perjury they could take appropriate action.317 
Nor did the department make much headway with its second 
reported case under the new act. The individual was Edward J. 
Fitzgerald, a former government economist and researcher whom 
Elizabeth Bentley named as a member of an alleged Victor Perlo 
espionage group. He remained silent and announced that he was 
going to carry his case to the Supreme Court too. The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his sentence on the basis 
of the Ullmann decision.318 · · · 
However,. the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
apparently h;;td somewhat more success with the new act. One of 
its witnesses, Ellis Olim, a municipal employee in Chjcago, an-
nounced that under a grant of immunity he would reply. ~o ques-
tions he previously had refused to answer.319 
Nevertheless, with or without the new act, some politie;;tl 
deviants will remain wholly uncooperative, as were the Rosen-
810 N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1956, p. 7:3-5. 
817 N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1956, p. 8:2. 
318 United States v. Fitzgerald, (2d Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 453, cert. den. 352 U.S. 842 
(1956). 
819 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1955, p. 33:4-5.. . 
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bergs, others will be insufficiently cooperative in the eyes of the 
.authorities, as was Ullmann, and yet others will be overly coopera-
tive, and overly submissive, as were Matusow, Crouch and too many 
more. The new act may even worsen this situation. It has been 
highly overrated. 
Moreover, in order to try to reach the illusion of the additional 
information which such acts hold out to us we take a step in the 
direction of the inquisitional technique, and degrade individuals 
by giving them the choice either of confessing their sins and nam-
ing their associates or going to jail. We give up part of our birth-
right for less than a mess of pottage. The compulsory confession of 
one's sins and the naming of one's associates may be standard oper-
ating procedure in authoritarian regimes, but it is unbecoming a 
free people. 
Conclusion 
Immunity acts are a mirage which lead us from our accusa-
torial course with deviants to an inquisitional one. This in itself 
is unfortunate, for our accusatorial method has helped us to de-
velop a more independent and mature citizenry than will be found 
in eastern countries. With us an individual does not have to be 
submissive when the state points an accusing finger at him: he has 
a right to remain silent, along with a right to counsel, to a formal 
accusation, to bail in nearly all ~ases, to a public trial, to be con-
fronted with his accusers, and to be proved guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt. We should not let any of these rights atrophy, least 
of all th:e right of silence, 
Moreover, immunity acts are also a delusion. We think we are 
going to get much additional information by the use of them, 
when the truth of the matter is that in all probability we shall get 
most of the information we want without them. We shall get this 
information because human beings have a compulsion to confess 
to something. Immunity acts are thus unnecessary. The govern-
ment has most of the story of the communist conspiracy in this 
country. An immunity act will add little, if anything, to our store 
of knowledge in this field. By passing an immunity act in order to 
obtain this possible additional mite we give up part of our heritage. 
The cost is too great. 
As far as the new federal act is concerned it is submitted that 
paragraphs (a) and (b) relating to congressional witnesses are un-
constitutional on the ground that the approval which paragraph 
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(b) requires of federal district courts to proposed congressional 
grants of immunity is a nonjudicial function. If there is to be such 
an act the granting of immunity should not rest with the courts. 
Nor should it rest with Congress. Rather it should rest with those 
agencies of the executive branch of government which have to do 
with the investigation and prosecution of offenses. With a little 
more work by the Court the new federal act, despite the intent of 
Congress, may ultimately be reduced to this form. So far the Court, 
in the Ullmann case, has downgraded paragraph (c) relating to 
witnesses before federal courts and grand juries to the point where 
the granting of immunity in such instances really rests with the 
Department of Justice. Now if the Court in an appropriate future 
proceeding will eliminate paragraphs (a) and (b), then the only 
effect of the new act will be to provide the Department of Justice 
with an immunity act of its own.320 Many other arms of the execu-
tive branch already have them. 
However, it is still to be regretted that compulsory testimony 
provisions have been extended beyond the field of economic regu-
lation into the field of belief and expression of opinions, a field 
that with us has received an added measure of protection in the 
First Amendment. The First Amendment freedoms have prob-
ably played the most important part in our political growth, and 
we should not allow them to be eroded by an immunity act which 
humors the current demand for cqnformity more than it serves any 
other purpose. 
820 Congress might then pass an immunity act for itself which would not require court 
approval of proposed grants of immunity. 
